(Phnom Penh): Following Thailand’s unilateral termination of the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding, or MOU-2001, Cambodia turned to international law, initiating compulsory conciliation under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS.

From Cambodia’s formal notification on June 2, 2026, through August, the five-member Conciliation Commission was fully constituted, with Katrina Cooper appointed as its chair.

But the formation of the Commission does not mark the end of the process. Rather, it opens the door to the most substantive phase of the conciliation proceedings.

What Happens Next?

The next step will be for the Commission to establish its procedures and timetable. It will then hear from Cambodia and Thailand, examine their respective claims, evidence and legal arguments, and explore possible grounds for resolving their differences.

The Commission, however, is not a court tasked with deciding whether Cambodia or Thailand “wins.”

Its purpose is to help identify common ground that could lead the two sides toward a mutually acceptable settlement.

This distinction is essential to understanding the term “compulsory conciliation.”

The word “compulsory” does not mean that the Commission’s final recommendations can be imposed on either country. Rather, it means that the proceedings can continue even if one party refuses to participate or attempts to prevent the process from moving forward.

Put simply: participation in the process can be compulsory, but the outcome is not a binding judgment.

When Can a Result Be Expected?

Under UNCLOS, the Commission is required to produce a report within 12 months of its constitution, unless the parties agree otherwise.

Because the Cambodia–Thailand Commission was fully constituted in August 2026, the key timeframe would therefore fall around August 2027, unless Cambodia and Thailand agree to modify that timetable.

The report may contain conclusions on relevant questions of fact and law, as well as recommendations that the Commission considers appropriate for facilitating an amicable settlement.

But one point must be clear: the report is not a court judgment.

The Commission cannot draw a maritime boundary and then compel Cambodia and Thailand to accept it.

If the Report Is Not Binding, Why Does It Matter?

The report’s importance lies in its potential to create a new basis for negotiation.

Until now, Cambodia has maintained its position, while Thailand has maintained its own. Once the Commission issues its report, however, the negotiating table could also include conclusions and recommendations from an independent international commission.

More importantly, under UNCLOS, after the Commission presents its report, the two parties are required to negotiate an agreement on the basis of that report.

The process can therefore be summarized simply as:

Commission → Evidence and Legal Arguments → Report → Negotiation → Agreement

What If Negotiations Still Fail? Does the Dispute Automatically Go to Court?

The answer is no.

After the Commission issues its report, Cambodia and Thailand must negotiate in an effort to reach an agreement based on its findings and recommendations. If those negotiations succeed, the result would be an agreement between the two countries.

But if they fail, the dispute does not automatically move to an international court or another binding dispute-settlement mechanism.
Cambodia and Thailand would first have to agree on what legal mechanism they wish to use next.

In other words, it would be inaccurate to say: Unsuccessful conciliation → Automatic referral to court.

A more accurate sequence would be: Report → Negotiation → Agreement, if the parties reach common ground

If no agreement is reached, Cambodia and Thailand must then determine whether they can mutually agree on another mechanism for resolving the dispute.

What Does Past Experience Tell Us?

One important international precedent for Cambodia and Thailand is the maritime boundary dispute between Timor-Leste and Australia.

In 2016, Timor-Leste initiated compulsory conciliation proceedings under UNCLOS in an effort to resolve its maritime boundary dispute with Australia.

That process did not end with the dispute being referred to a court.

Instead, the Conciliation Commission helped the two sides continue negotiations and narrow their differences until they were able to reach agreement on their maritime boundary.

In 2018, Timor-Leste and Australia signed a treaty establishing their maritime boundaries.

The case illustrates an important feature of compulsory conciliation: its primary purpose is not to send disputing states to court. It is to bring parties with conflicting positions back into a structured negotiating process and help them find a path toward agreement.

That does not mean the Cambodia–Thailand case will necessarily produce the same outcome. Every dispute has its own facts, national interests, legal issues and political context.

But the Timor-Leste–Australia experience demonstrates that conciliation and its final report are not necessarily the end of the road, while litigation is not automatically the next step.

If conciliation succeeds in narrowing the differences between the parties, the process can ultimately lead to an agreement without either side having to take the dispute to court.

Put simply, the success of compulsory conciliation is not measured by which side wins a case. It is measured by whether the process can move the parties from deadlock toward agreement.

Conclusion

With the Compulsory Conciliation Commission now fully constituted, Cambodia and Thailand have moved beyond the stage of “creating the mechanism” and are entering the stage of “using the mechanism.”

The Commission will now hear from both sides, examine their claims, evidence and legal arguments, and seek common ground that could help resolve the dispute. If no agreement is reached during the process, the Commission is expected under UNCLOS to prepare its report within 12 months of its constitution, unless the parties agree otherwise.

But the report is neither a judgment nor the end of the dispute. Its purpose is to provide a basis for Cambodia and Thailand to continue negotiations toward an agreement.

The experience of Timor-Leste and Australia shows that compulsory conciliation can move a long-standing maritime dispute from deadlock toward a negotiated settlement without the case necessarily ending up before a court.

So, to answer the central question — where does the Cambodia–Thailand legal process go from here?

The immediate next step is not court proceedings. It is the conciliation process itself: examining the competing claims, narrowing differences and seeking a foundation on which the two countries can negotiate an agreement.

If that process succeeds, the end result could be an agreement between Cambodia and Thailand.

If, however, the Commission’s report and subsequent negotiations still fail to produce an agreement, a new question will arise: Can Cambodia and Thailand agree on what legal dispute-settlement mechanism should come next?

In short, the purpose of compulsory conciliation is not to determine a winner and a loser. It is to find a path that can move both sides toward an agreement.