(PHNOM PENH): The Russia–Ukraine war has given North Korea something that peacetime training at home could never fully replicate: experience on a real battlefield.

North Korean troops deployed alongside Russian forces have been exposed to drone warfare, artillery, advanced battlefield surveillance and the pressures of actual combat. Analysts at 38 North have assessed that the experience could help Pyongyang learn important lessons about drone operations, counter-drone tactics and adaptation to modern warfare.

Now, a reverse question is emerging in South Korea.

As the U.S.–Iran war continues and the Strait of Hormuz remains a high-risk operational environment, Seoul is considering options for participating in international efforts to protect freedom of navigation. South Korea has sent a team to assess the situation, but as of September 12, Seoul has not decided to deploy military forces to Hormuz.

The possibility has already drawn a warning from Tehran. Iran has cautioned that South Korean military involvement could bring “serious consequences.” On September 11, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and his South Korean counterpart, Cho Hyun, also discussed the situation around Hormuz and freedom of navigation.

Tehran’s warning suggests that it does not view possible South Korean involvement as merely a routine maritime-security issue. Such a deployment could bring another U.S. ally from Asia into the operational environment of a Middle Eastern war.

That raises a broader question: If South Korea joins operations around Hormuz and its forces are exposed to genuine threats, could the Iran war provide Seoul with real-world operational experience—just as the war in Ukraine has provided battlefield experience to Pyongyang?

What Has North Korea Learned From Ukraine?

Ukraine has effectively become a real-world school of modern warfare for North Korea.

Analysts at 38 North have assessed that North Korean forces have gained exposure to drone operations, counter-drone warfare, concealment, movement under persistent surveillance and battlefield adaptation.
Reuters has also reported that the use of North Korean missiles and rockets in Ukraine could provide Pyongyang with valuable battlefield data for improving its weapons.

In short, North Korea has not only helped Russia fight its war; it has also had an opportunity to learn from modern combat.

What Could South Korea Learn at Hormuz?
South Korea has sent a team to assess the situation, but as of September 12, Seoul has not decided to deploy military forces to the Strait of Hormuz.
Even if it does participate, that would not mean South Korea is going to the Middle East for the purpose of “training for war.” Its official mission could involve protecting commercial shipping, safeguarding freedom of navigation or supporting multinational maritime-security operations.

But the purpose of a deployment and its consequences are not necessarily the same.

If South Korean forces were required to operate in an environment threatened by drones, missiles, naval mines and unmanned systems, they could gain experience that peacetime exercises cannot fully reproduce.
Those lessons could include ship protection, drone and missile interception, mine countermeasures, intelligence gathering under pressure and joint operations with U.S. forces.

Hormuz could therefore provide South Korea with real-world operational experience—even if gaining such experience were never the original purpose of the deployment.

The Two Koreas Would Learn Different Lessons
North Korea has gained much of its experience from land warfare—including drones, artillery, infantry operations and combat under persistent surveillance.

South Korea, if deployed to Hormuz, could gain a different set of lessons from maritime warfare and joint operations—including ship protection, counter-drone and missile defense, mine countermeasures and coordination with U.S. forces.

For Pyongyang, therefore, the issue may extend beyond whether Seoul sends forces to the Middle East. A more important question could be: What experience would South Korean forces bring home?

North Korea itself has already seen the value of learning from real combat through its involvement alongside Russia. If Seoul enters the Hormuz theater, Pyongyang could therefore view the deployment as an opportunity for South Korea to strengthen its operational capabilities and interoperability with U.S. forces under real-world pressure.

The experiences of the two Koreas would be different, but the strategic consequence could be similar: both militaries could return to the Korean Peninsula carrying new lessons learned from wars fought far from home.
In that sense, what could make Pyongyang uneasy is not simply Seoul’s presence at Hormuz, but the military lessons South Korea might bring back to the Korean Peninsula.
Could This Change the Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula?

The answer is: It could have an impact, but battlefield experience alone would not fundamentally overturn the military balance.

The balance on the Korean Peninsula still depends on much larger factors: North Korea’s nuclear weapons, missiles and artillery; South Korea’s air and naval capabilities; intelligence and advanced technology; and, crucially, the U.S.–South Korea alliance.

Combat experience, however, can change how effectively existing military power is used.

That means the future competition between the two Koreas may not be determined only by the question, “Who has more weapons?”

Another question may become increasingly important:
“Who can learn faster from modern warfare—and turn those lessons into better tactics, technology and operational capability?”

Conclusion
So, could the Iran war provide South Korea with combat experience in return for the experience North Korea has gained from the Russia–Ukraine war?
Potentially yes—but only if Seoul decides to participate and its forces operate under genuine wartime threats.

North Korea has learned lessons from land warfare in Ukraine. South Korea, if deployed to Hormuz, could learn from maritime warfare, ship protection, counter-drone and missile defense, and joint operations with U.S. forces.
The longer-term concern for the Korean Peninsula, therefore, is not simply what weapons the two Koreas possess. It is also what they are learning from real wars abroad—and how they may bring those lessons home to strengthen their military capabilities.

But there is a wider concern.
If the war in the Middle East continues to draw in allies and partners from outside the region, a conflict that began within one theater could gradually expand into a war involving a growing number of countries.

This does not mean World War III has begun, nor does it mean a global war is inevitable. But the risk rises when a regional conflict begins pulling in allies from other parts of the world and previously separate theaters of tension start becoming connected.

That is the larger danger the world should watch.
A global war does not necessarily begin with anyone declaring a “world war.” It can emerge through a chain of escalation that draws more countries into conflict, one after another.